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Darwin’s 19th century evolutionary theory of descent with mod-
ification through natural selection opened up a multidimensional
and integrative conceptual space for biology. We explore three
dimensions of this space: explanatory pattern, levels of selection,
and degree of difference among units of the same type. Each
dimension is defined by a respective pair of poles: law and
narrative explanation, organismic and hierarchical selection, and
variational and essentialist thinking. As a consequence of concep-
tual debates in the 20th century biological sciences, the poles of
each pair came to be seen as mutually exclusive opposites. A
significant amount of 21st century research focuses on systems
(e.g., genomic, cellular, organismic, and ecological/global). Sys-
temic Darwinism is emerging in this context. It follows a ‘‘compo-
sitional paradigm’’ according to which complex systems and their
hierarchical networks of parts are the focus of biological investi-
gation. Through the investigation of systems, Systemic Darwinism
promises to reintegrate each dimension of Darwin’s original logical
space. Moreover, this ideally and potentially unified theory of
biological ontology coordinates and integrates a plurality of math-
ematical biological theories (e.g., self-organization/structure, cla-
distics/history, and evolutionary genetics/function). Integrative
Systemic Darwinism requires communal articulation from a plural-
ity of perspectives. Although it is more general than these, it draws
on previous advances in Systems Theory, Systems Biology, and
Hierarchy Theory. Systemic Darwinism would greatly further bio-
engineering research and would provide a significantly deeper and
more critical understanding of biological reality.
biological theory  ecology  genetics  evolution  systems theory
There is grandeur in this view of life, with its several
powers, having been originally breathed into a few forms
or into one; and that whilst this planet has gone cycling
on according to the fixed laws of gravity, from so simple
a beginning endless forms most beautiful and most
wonderful have been, and are being, evolved.
Ref. 1, p. 490.
Thus concludes Darwin’s On the Origin of Species by Means ofNatural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the
Struggle for Life (hereafter referred to as On the Origin of
Species). We interpret Darwin’s ‘‘view of life’’ as a conceptual
space consisting of three dimensions: explanatory pattern, levels
of selection, and degree of difference among units of the same
type. Each respective dimension is defined by a pair of poles: law
and narrative explanations, organismic and hierarchical selec-
tion, and variational and essentialist thinking. Darwin’s integra-
tive theory linking biological structure, history, and function was
nursed and reared within this logical space. During the 20th
century, the poles of each pair came to be seen as mutually
exclusive. Systemic Darwinism, emerging at the beginning of the
21st century, promises to reintegrate Darwin’s view of life.
We are, in all likelihood, at a historical cusp of biological
theory. Exponential progress is being made in developing new
interdisciplinary ways of conducting experiments, gathering
data, and articulating theory about systemic objects and pro-
cesses at spatiotemporal scales and hierarchical levels ranging
from tiny genomic systems to midlevel cellular and organismic
systems to truly immense ecological/global systems. The rise of
Systems Biology is one such productive interdisciplinary re-
search program (2, 3).
However, Systemic Darwinism provides a significantly more
general and integrative perspective on complex biological sys-
tems than Systems Biology. First, it highlights the astounding
ontological complexity of biological reality: dynamical self-
organizing systems (composed of hierarchical networks of parts)
are genealogical and can therefore undergo selection. Systemic
Darwinism thus follows a ‘‘compositional paradigm’’ according
to which complex systems together with their diverse hierarchical
networks of parts—and not just basement parts—are considered
the focus of biological investigation.
Second, Systemic Darwinism emphasizes epistemic complexity.
Although Systemic Darwinism does not seek to replace, or legislate
over, ongoing local investigations across the biological sciences, it
wishes to forestall radical fragmentation of biological theory. Its
basic argument is that because biological systems are complex, a
unified theoretical framework that coordinates, integrates, and
even partially embeds a plurality of theories about systems is
required to capture and manage this complexity. No single manner
of analyzing biological complexity can provide a complete repre-
sentation of biological reality. Insisting on the epistemic (i.e.,
explanatory and descriptive) completeness of any single theoretical
abstraction would lead to dangerous reifications.
Thus, the integration and ideal unification of a plurality of
biological theories investigating the same basic entities/
processes—complex systems—are necessary for complete and
nonreified scientific understanding and for effective means of
intervention. That is, Systemic Darwinism harnesses epistemic
complexity to analyze and control ontological complexity. It
does this in two ways:
1.1.1. Each pole of each dimension—and each dimension it-
self—of Darwin’s three-dimensional view of life is found
to be productive for theory and practice. Systemic Dar-
winism makes Darwin’s conceptual space whole.
1.1.2. Each of the three great 20th century mathematical bio-
logical theories remains essential for articulating a general
theory of biological systems: the theory of dynamical
self-organization [a theory of complex structure (e.g.,
4–7)], cladistics [a theory of biological history (e.g.,
8–10)], and evolutionary genetics [a theory of adaptive
function (e.g., 11–13)]. Systemic Darwinism coordinates,
integrates, and partially embeds these three explanatory
theories, in part through the use of the conceptual space
of 1.1.1.
Moreover, the historical arc of this argument is:
1.2.1. Darwin lays out the logical space of evolutionary theory
in 1859.
1.2.2. As a consequence of conceptual debates in the 20th
century biological sciences, the poles of each pair come to
be seen as mutually exclusive opposites.
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1.2.3. New ways of thinking about genomic, cellular, organismic,
and ecological/global systems at the beginning of the 21st
century promise to restructure Darwin’s view of life and
to successfully integrate the 20th century’s three main
mathematical biological theories. (Again, these two ef-
forts intertwine.) A communal and explicit articulation of
Systemic Darwinism is necessary to achieve this.
In what follows, the three dimensions of Darwin’s view of life
are analyzed (i) in his work, (ii) in the 20th century, and (iii) in
the context of 21st century Systemic Darwinism. In the conclu-
sion, methodologies and directions useful for attaining Systemic
Darwinism are briefly sketched.
Explanatory Pattern: Law and Narrative. The iconic view of science
is that it fundamentally concerns mathematical laws (14, 15).
These empirical generalizations and theoretical principles con-
stitute the universal regularities of nature; moreover, they
ground surprising and dangerous predictions. The more success-
ful the law-based predictions of a science are, the more justified
we are in believing its theories (16). In particular, physics is
highly mathematical—consider the two great 20th century phys-
ical theories, Quantum Mechanics and Relativity Theory. Al-
though an absolute consensus about the importance of laws and
predictions in physics is lacking (17), mathematical laws are
often interpreted as the basic building blocks of these explana-
tory theoretical edifices. This view is also important for the
mathematical theories of Systemic Darwinism.
Systemic Darwinism also includes a contrasting yet comple-
mentary perspective on science. Darwinism involves the biolog-
ical sciences of deep time, meta-change, and complex systems.
First, our time is deep and punctuated time and not just the
dynamical linear time of the state spaces that physicists canon-
ically study; Darwinists investigate genealogical systems that are
embedded in immense tracts of geological time. Second, our
change is meta-change; Darwinists explore the evolutionary
transformations of biological systems that themselves change
(e.g., organisms). Third, our systems are not easily decomposable
(18); Darwinists examine systems that are irreducibly complex.
Deep time, meta-change, and complex systems—these are hardly
preconditions for closed-form physical mathematical laws with
strong predictive capacity.
Indeed, the types of explanations that were seen bymany in the
20th century as the most appropriate for analyzing genealogy are
not law-based explanations sensu stricto (‘‘nomothetic’’) but are
instead narrative explanations (‘‘ideographic’’) (19–23). Evolu-
tionary narrative explanations interweave causally related phy-
logenetic events of biological systems. Consider the structured
narratives of the evolution of flowering plants, wings, or human
brains. These articulated stories make explicit the historical
patterns and processes of biological systems such as species;
these narratives thereby produce scientific explanation.
Darwin was aware of both sorts of explanations. He repeatedly
wrote about the laws of variation, reproduction, correlation, and
heredity and even about the laws of natural selection, the
struggle for life, divergence of character, and extinction. The last
sentence of On the Origin of Species established an analogy
between Darwin’s evolutionary view of life and Newton’s ‘‘fixed
laws of gravity.’’ Furthermore, in another well known passage he
noted:
It is interesting to contemplate an entangled bank,
clothed with many plants of many kinds, with birds
singing on the bushes, with various insects f litting about,
and with worms crawling through the damp earth, and
to reflect that these elaborately constructed forms, so
different from each other, and dependent on each other
in so complex a manner, have all been produced by laws
acting around us.
Ref. 1, p. 489, emphasis added.
Even in an entangled bank—even in a complex system—laws act
and produce. Laws govern.
Now, his main goal in 1859 was to establish the plausibility and
empirical adequacy of descent with modification through natural
selection. Descent with modification was represented—
conceptually and in the only diagram in his 1859 book—as a Tree
of Life [which, today, we know can be reticulated (24)]. With
respect to classification, Darwin observed: ‘‘. . . I believe this
element of descent is the hidden bond of connexion which
naturalists have sought under the term of the Natural System’’
(ref. 1, p. 433). Furthermore, concerning embryology, Darwin
wrote: ‘‘. . . community in embryonic structure reveals commu-
nity of descent’’ (ref. 1, p. 449). Thus, genealogy is a fundamental
explanatory principle of biological systems. The models for this
sort of explanation are narratives rather than laws sensu stricto.
Darwin did not discuss predictive power in the physicists’
sense nor did he ever attempt to formalize laws (Darwinists were
to do that in the 20th century). However, his narrative-centered
view of life still provides precious understanding. In a passage
indicative of his colonial prejudices, he noted that ‘‘the study of
natural history’’ will become ‘‘far more interesting’’ ‘‘when we no
longer look at an organic being as a savage looks at a ship, as at
something wholly beyond his comprehension; when we regard
every production of nature as one which has had a history. . . ’’
(ref. 1, pp. 485–486). The integration of many causal historical
factors in narratives produces scientific understanding.
Part of the ongoing research project of Systemic Darwinism is
to determine whether its mathematical theories will ever own the
strong predictive power characteristic of many domains of
physics. For instance, the theory of self-organizing systems
promises to produce fairly robust formal laws of the generally
predictive patterns of ontogenetic processes (4–7, 25). Now,
because of the complexity of such systems, single laws will at best
only be weakly predictive; sets of laws, however, may yet turn out
to be strongly predictive. Moreover, narrative explanations,
broadly construed as articulated stories of temporally organized
and causally connected events (19–23, 26), can be at least weakly
predictive of both development (e.g., prediction of the gene
regulation sequence of limb bud development) and genealogy
[e.g., predicted/retrodicted ‘‘transitional fossils’’ that are subse-
quently discovered such as Tiktaalik roseae (27)]; at times,
Darwin appealed to prediction in this weak sense (e.g., ref. 1, p.
126). Thus, Systemic Darwinism aims to be predictive and
explanatory through the employment of both laws and narra-
tives, in self-organization theory as well as in cladistics and
evolutionary genetics.
In short, Systemic Darwinism productively intertwines math-
ematical laws/nomothetic explanations (as presented by the
three mathematical biological theories of structure, history, and
function) with narratives/ideographic explanations. Perhaps bi-
ological systems will turn out to be analogous to complex physical
systems such as weather systems, where laws and narratives also
intertwine. The integration happens in at least two ways. First,
laws form part of the content of narratives; narratives grant an
overarching theoretical framework for integrating laws. Laws
and narratives are thus complementary. Second, and more
deeply, the very distinction between laws and narratives will have
to be rethought—perhaps they depend on and, ultimately,
reconfigure each other.
Levels of Selection: Organismic and Hierarchical. For Darwin, the
primary engine of evolutionary change was natural selection:
‘‘Furthermore, I am convinced that Natural Selection has been
the main but not exclusive means of modification’’ (ref. 1, p. 6).
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Natural selection is the only mechanism that can produce
adaptations. By adding a further premise (admittedly conten-
tious but one that Darwin seems to have held), namely, that
natural selection often results in adaptation, it follows that most
evolutionary modifications are adaptive. Darwin was indeed an
adaptationist. Systemic Darwinism need not agree with him on
this point; this issue (28, 29) should be explicitly and vigorously
addressed (see Section 4).
Particularly in chapters 3 and 4 of On the Origin of Species,
Darwin explicated selection in familiar terms: given limited
resources, more organisms are born than can survive, so there is
a struggle for existence. Varieties more ‘‘fit’’ to their environ-
ment leave relatively more offspring. Over time, there is thus
cumulative change in the species. In chapter 4, he noted: ‘‘This
preservation of favourable variations and the rejection of inju-
rious variations, I call Natural Selection’’ (ref. 1, p. 81). Evolution
through natural selection has three individually necessary and
collectively sufficient conditions: (i) phenotypic variation (ii)
differential reproductive success and (iii) heritability (30). This
is the recipe, the algorithm, for selected cumulative change in
species.
A set of questions immediately arises: at what level(s) is(are)
the unit(s) that is(are) undergoing selection? Are the unit(s) that
compete and undergo differential reproductive success classi-
cally defined organisms, families (i.e., groups of organisms) or
even larger subpopulations of a species? Perhaps units are found
at more than one level? Darwin addressed these questions in a
piecemeal and incomplete manner. During the 20th century,
they blossomed and a plurality of answers led to increasingly
polarized general theories.
Although he focused on organismic selection, Darwin was
moved by a very specific ‘‘difficulty on theory’’ in chapter 6 of his
magnum opus: how can natural selection of organisms in the
struggle for existence explain the evolution of sterility in the
workers of social insects? That is, how can selection successfully
act on organisms that never leave offspring? Here is Darwin’s
answer:
[W]ith the working antwe have an insect differing greatly
from its parents, yet absolutely sterile; so that it could
never have transmitted successively acquired modifica-
tions of structure or instinct to its progeny. It may well
be asked how is it possible to reconcile this case with the
theory of natural selection? This difficulty, though ap-
pearing insuperable, is lessened, or, as I believe, disap-
pears, when it is remembered that selection may be
applied to the family, as well as to the individual, andmay
thus gain the desired end.
Ref. 1, p. 237, emphasis added.
Sterile workers cannot and did not leave offspring. However,
their kin, in particular their mother, did. The level of selection
is the entire family. Darwin was willing to use group selection,
and hence hierarchical selection more generally, to explain the
acquisition and progressive accumulation of characters such as
sterility in social insects and altruism in humans.
In The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex (31),
Darwin argued that the appropriate level of selection for the
evolution of human altruism was the human tribe, the group.
Organismic selection cannot account for the existence of altruistic
traits such as ‘‘patriotism, fidelity, obedience, courage and sympa-
thy’’ (ref. 31, vol. 1, p. 166). These characters are hardly beneficial
for the reproductive success of individual humans. However, higher
level group (tribal) selection can explain human individual altruism.
And how does this higher level process happen? Recall that
evolution by natural selection requires heritable variance in fitness.
Here, we have variation in the frequency of altruists of different
tribes. Furthermore, tribes with a higher frequency of altruists
increase in relative size and relative number (i.e., have a higher
reproductive success) for two reasons: (i) there is more intratribal
sharing of resources, dictated by tribal norms and moral codes, and
(ii) tribes compete with one another for limited ecological re-
sources, including food, territory, and even dominion over other
tribes, and those with higher frequencies of altruists are better able
to secure limited resources. Finally, Darwin suggested, there is
heritability of altruism (and selfishness). We thus have variance,
differential reproductive success, and heritability (i.e., the three
conditions for evolution through natural selection) of altruism at
the tribal level.
This discussion became exceedingly important in the 20th
century. The ‘‘levels of selection’’ debate involves strongly
polarized positions. Genic selection, which is the logical exten-
sion of organismic selection, has perhaps been most strongly
championed by Dawkins (32), building on the work of R.A.
Fisher (see also 33). In contrast, there are biologists advocating
hierarchical selection (34, 35), some of which take their inspi-
ration from S. Wright’s ‘‘Shifting Balance Theory.’’ Both sides
defend convincing models and arguments. Moreover, important
connections between the two positions also exist (36). The
nature of kin selection as either genic or hierarchical, or both, is
also an ongoing dispute (36–38). Moreover, the levels of selec-
tion hierarchy have been explicitly expanded to include levels as
large as species and evenmore inclusive clades of the Tree of Life
(39–42). Darwin had also made reference to an upward expansion
of levels of selection to varieties, species, and genera (ref. 1, p. 126;
ref. 43, p. 238), but 20th century debates added significant formal
and conceptual precision to the above questions.
A cogent solution to the levels of selection debate requires the
hierarchical selection defended by Systemic Darwinism. Hier-
archical selection subsumes genic selection—it is the more
general model in that it includes genic selection as a limiting case
when populations are extremely large, and gene interaction is
negligible. Furthermore, hierarchical selection is productive in
that it sheds light on how ‘‘individuals’’ of various types can
evolve at levels other than the organismic level (i.e., not all
individuals need be organisms [e.g., colonial individuals, sym-
bionts/hosts, bacterial ‘‘metagenomes’’]) (see refs. 24, 44–48). In
this context, hierarchical selection, higher levels of individuality,
and evolutionary transitions require an understanding of the
mathematical theories of self-organizing developmental systems,
cladistics, and evolutionary genetics. Moreover, note that the
legitimate use of Ockham’s razor to deem genic selection a
sufficient model for particular cases of selection is an empirical
question. Recent evidence suggests that population structure
and gene interaction are indeed ubiquitous (e.g., 49); hence
hierarchical selection is more empirically adequate for most
cases of evolution. However, genic selection can still play a
heuristic role as a partial representation of complex biological
reality that provides understanding through a powerfully simple,
idealized, and limit-case model of selection.
Degree of Difference Among Units of the Same Type: Variational and
Essentialist Thinking. Variation is a necessary condition for evo-
lution by natural selection. According to Dewey (50) and Mayr
(51), Darwin was crucial in moving us away from a Platonic-
Aristotelian typological essentialism, where all tokens of the
same biological type are interpreted as fundamentally identical
and where the type is defined by an essential nature, to a
variational thinking in which even similar biological material
units exhibit myriad differences and are not strongly defined by
essential natures. There is some truth to this account of the
intellectual history, but it is clear that Darwin actually took both
sorts of thinking very seriously. Systemic Darwinism also en-
gages both variational and essentialist thinking.
Darwin emphasized variation. The first two chapters ofOn the
Origin of Species document, respectively, ‘‘Variation Under
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Domestication’’ (particularly in pigeons) and ‘‘Variation Under
Nature.’’ Darwin reminded us that: ‘‘every one admits that there
are at least individual differences in species under nature’’ (ref.
1, p. 468). In the first 1868 edition of The Variation of Animals
and Plants Under Domestication (52), Darwin also recorded
ubiquitous variation in domesticated organisms.
Moreover, in 1859, he wrote:
It may be said that natural selection is daily and hourly
scrutinising, throughout the world, every variation, even
the slightest; rejecting that which is bad, preserving and
adding up all that is good; silently and insensibly work-
ing, whenever and wherever opportunity offers, at the
improvement of each organic being in relation to its
organic and inorganic conditions of life.
Ref. 1, p. 84, emphasis added.
Natural selection is highly efficient—it works on every variation.
It thereby produces adaptations in each lineage.
Darwin did not discard essentialist thinking, however. Following
a long tradition, he noted that homologous organs [e.g., human
arms, bat wings, porpoise paddles (ref. 1, p. 434)] have the ‘‘same
pattern’’ (p. 457) across species, regardless of their purpose. Ac-
cording to typological thinking, this sameness of pattern is meant
literally and indicates a deeper identity, a unity of type: ‘‘By unity
of type is meant that fundamental agreement in structure, which we
see in organic beings of the same class, and which is quite inde-
pendent of their habits of life’’ (p. 206). As cases of unity of type,
consider the general architectural and developmental patterns of
vertebrates or arthropods. These patterns are the essence, and
thereby define the baupla¨ne or the archetypes, of these phyla (and
of lower level clades within the phyla) (53). Now, Darwin accepted
that this unity of type was abstractly characterized by the practicing
biologist: morphology was the ‘‘very soul’’ of natural history (ref. 1,
p. 434). However, Darwin’s great contribution in this context was
to provide a purely historical and material explanation of the
essential unity of type:
If we suppose that the ancient progenitor, the archetype
as it may be called, of all mammals, had its limbs
constructed on the existing general pattern, for whatever
purpose they served, we can at once perceive the plain
signification of the homologous construction of the
limbs throughout the whole class.
Ref. 1, p. 435.
Archetypes are actual ancestors. Furthermore, extant homolo-
gies are the result of the inheritance of unity of type from
ancestors: ‘‘on my theory, unity of type is explained by unity of
descent’’ (ref. 1, p. 206). Very basically then, Darwin developed
a notion of historico-material types.
Darwin insisted on the importance of variation for natural
selection. Moreover, he emphasized archetypes and homologies
as historical and material entities that could be abstractly
characterized as types for pragmatic classificatory purposes. He
was both a variational and an essentialist thinker.
In the 20th century, the tension between variational and
essentialist thinking developed into the debate over the power of
‘‘constraints’’ on the operation of natural selection. Essentialist
thinking tends to be structuralist. Here, structure refers both to
unity of type and to self-organization (e.g., refs. 4–7, 25, 53–55).
Structuralism is often opposed to functionalism, which focuses
on variational thinking and natural selection (but see ref. 4 for
a synthetic approach). The debate between structuralists and
functionalists became particularly strong in the 1980s and re-
volved around the following questions: What is the nature and
extent of architectural, developmental, and historical constraints
on selectable variation? How much selectable variation can the
hand, the eye, cellular metabolism, or the height of an Arabi-
dopsis thaliana plant exhibit? In short, how free or constrained
is natural selection? The debate is ongoing (56, 57).
Systemic Darwinism allows us to reconsider the basic premises
of this and other related discussions. For instance, current
literature on the ‘‘natural kind’’ structure of homologies empha-
sizes the simultaneous importance of variational and essentialist
thinking (10, 58–60). Both forms of thinking are needed as
epistemic frameworks to effectively understand biological real-
ity. This is consistent with Darwin’s views. Moreover, Systemic
Darwinism highlights the importance of each pole for each of the
mathematical theories: (i) the theory of dynamical self-
organization finds patterns of variation, change, and instability
(i.e., variational thinking) and of constraint, similarity, and
robustness (i.e., essentialist thinking) in gene and cellular net-
works; (ii) cladistics classifies species (and higher level clades)
using typologically defined homologies but also describes in-
traspecific and intraclade variation; and (iii) evolutionary genet-
ics assesses the population structure of genetic variation and lack
of genetic variation. As is also the case with the first dimension
of Darwin’s view of life, we will ultimately need to rethink and
reconfigure the very distinction between variational and essen-
tialist thinking.
Systemic Darwinism. We have explored three dimensions structur-
ing the logical space of Darwinism. These are defined by pairs of
poles: law and narrative explanations, organismic and hierarchical
selection, and variational and essentialist thinking. Darwin gave
narrative explanation and variational thinking an analytical life that
they had previously lacked. Moreover, he introduced the whole
issue of levels of selection. In short, by identifying complementary
poles of particular dimensions, he articulated a new biological
conceptual space. To a large extent, this space allowed him to be the
first to productively link biological structure, history, and function
in a single theoretical structure. It is important to note that in
addition to being an extraordinary scientist, Darwin is also a trope.
Darwinism is an inordinately general, complex, and powerful
theory, ultimately surpassing Darwin’s or any other individual’s
greatest imagination.
Now, in attempting to reintegrate the Darwinian conceptual
space explored in this article, Systemic Darwinism should ask the
following questions (see also 1.1.1):
5.1.1. What are the appropriate relationships between mathe-
matical laws and historical narratives?
5.1.2. How should we model the fitnesses of units, and of
interactions among units, at different levels of selection in
self-organizing genealogical systems?
5.1.3. How are patterns of variation, change, and instability, and
those of constraint, similarity, and robustness, of parts and
systems, relevant to the structure, history, and function of
systems?
Furthermore, the three 20th century mathematical theories
investigating structure (theory of dynamic self-organization),
history (cladistics), and function (evolutionary genetics) have
underspecified and indeterminate intertheoretical relations. Re-
garding the three mathematical theories examined in this article,
Systemic Darwinism inquires (see also 1.1.2):
5.2.1. Under what conditions, and for what purposes, can and
should we use these theories simultaneously?
5.2.2. How can and should we go about integrating, coordinat-
ing, and embedding them in general?
5.2.3. Does each theory describe different formal aspects of the
same system, or does each provide unique criteria for
identifying distinct systems that could partially overlap with
the systems individuated by the other two theories (or both)?
These central questions regarding the Darwinian conceptual
space and the plurality of 20th century mathematical biological
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theories can be addressed by turning to the impressive amount
of theory available on systems, complexity, and hierarchy. Sys-
temic Darwinism draws on this work and invites collaboration.
Current Systems Biology (2, 3, 61–65) is indeed an important
research program for Systemic Darwinism. Powerful general
conceptual methods are being developed in this context, such as
conceptual continuity (66), modeling (67–69), abstraction (70),
and understanding (71). These epistemic tools will be necessary
for coordinating and integrating theoretical pluralism in Sys-
temic Darwinism. Moreover, many of the abstract strands of
Systems Biology grow out of earlier theoretical Systems Theory
(72–78). This work was crucial in its time and can provide
important formal tools (e.g., cybernetics, information theory,
mereology, relational modeling) for a general biological theory.
Systemic Darwinism is ‘‘dynamicist’’ (61) and ‘‘systems-
theoretic’’ (3). The only qualification in this context is to note
that Systems Biology and earlier Systems Theory concern pri-
marily self-organization and lower levels of systemic hierarchies.
These fundamental research areas have less to say about theories
of history and function.
However, important resources for a theoretical framework for
mathematical theories of genealogy and natural selection can be
found elsewhere. Hierarchy Theory, generally construed, has
developed concepts important for Systemic Darwinism such as
(i) the distinction between genealogical and ecological hierar-
chies (41, 79, 80), (ii) the notion that ‘‘biological evolution is an
entropic process’’ (ref. 81, p. xii), and (iii) the explicit concept of
large multicausal developmental systems, described either as
systems of cointeracting genes and environmental conditions
(82–84) or, more generally, as systems of hierarchical networks
of mutually coconstructing and interacting parts (41, 82; see also
refs. 85, 86). Moreover, proponents of general Hierarchy Theory
have articulated critical conceptual methods such as dialectical
thinking and identification of inappropriate modeling reifica-
tions (82, 87–90). Regarding dialectical thinking, the argument
is that seemingly mutually exclusive dichotomies can be turned
into complementary and interpenetrating poles (82, 83), as
Systemic Darwinism attempts to do with the three dimensions
explored in this article. Concerning reification, the worry is that
although mathematical modeling is powerful, a plurality of
methodologies and ‘‘clusters of models’’ (88) are necessary for
avoiding the reification of particular models and theories. In
short, general Hierarchy Theory is useful for theories andmodels
of history and function.
Systems Biology, Systems Theory, and Hierarchy Theory
provide rich resources for a Systemic Darwinism that (i) can
make Darwin’s view of life whole and (ii) can coordinate,
integrate, and partially embed the three 20th century mathe-
matical biological theories of structure, history, and function
here explored. Each individual theory is necessary but not
sufficient for a full and empirically adequate understanding of
complex biological ontology, just as each blindman provides only
a partial perspective of the proverbial elephant. Dialogue among
theories and among modeling perspectives within each theory
[e.g., Fisherian and Wrightian perspectives in evolutionary ge-
netics (90)], is essential, just as the elephant story can be
transformed to imagine blind wise women dialoguing with one
another in order to understand, communally, the nature of the
complex elephant. Ignoring key and legitimate abstractions can
lead to limited understanding, short-sightedness, and the stalling
of theoretical and empirical research at the community level.
Thus, although each mathematical theory will continue making
independent progress within its own domain, dialogue among
them is essential for the articulation of Systemic Darwinism.
Systemic Darwinism insists on the centrality of the composi-
tional paradigm and the possibility of providing a general
mathematical framework for the biological sciences. The enti-
ties/processes of study of biological mathematical theories are
networks of units at a variety of spatiotemporal scales and
hierarchical levels rather than individual atomistic units at just
the basement level. Thus, biological systems are much more like
social systems than solar systems. Moreover, biological mathe-
matical theories are more similar to computer science programs
than to physical theories.
Two final qualifications are in order. First, full Systemic Dar-
winism must explore (i) other dimensions and (ii) other mathe-
matical theories. Other dimensions also tend to follow the historical
arc noted at the end of Section 1. Three such dimensions are defined
by the following poles: (i) genetic and ecological explanations, (ii)
microevolution and macroevolution, and (iii) deterministic and
stochastic dynamics (e.g., refs. 79, 82, 91). Furthermore, theoretical
ecology (92) and analytical paleobiology (93) are other important
mathematical theories to be explored even if they are perhaps less
axiomatized and ‘‘axiomatizable’’.
Second, we may not be able to attain our regulative ideal.
There may be hidden unresolvable tensions or other currently
undiscovered reasons that impede attempts at unification. Be-
cause Systemic Darwinism is work in progress, we do not yet
know. However, even partly unified (i.e., disunified), general,
and ongoing SystemicDarwinism embedding different biological
theories would greatly further both our theoretical understand-
ing and the effectiveness of our interventions. Furthermore, to
avoid a higher level ‘‘reification regress,’’ Systemic Darwinism
should probably also eventually be compared with other sorts of
unification platforms that may be on offer. These are exciting
times for biological theory, and much work lies ahead of us.
In conclusion, let us return to the beginning of our story, to
1859. Given Darwin’s own concerns with (i) the ‘‘whole organi-
sation’’ (ref. 1, p. 143) and ‘‘reproductive system’’ (ref. 1, p. 131;
structure), (ii) the ‘‘natural system is a genealogical arrange-
ment’’ (ref. 1, p. 479; history), and (iii) the ‘‘perfection of. . .
coadaptation’’ (ref. 1, p. 3) and the ‘‘web of complex relations’’
(ref. 1, p. 73; function), he might very well have applauded the
efforts of Systemic Darwinism. By focusing on complex systems
and their hierarchical networks of parts, strong dichotomies can
be rethought as complementary and interpenetrating poles, and
theories can be integrated.
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